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Abstract:  Social movement research raises many complicated methodological issues for 
scholars.  This study systematically explains the methodological quandaries, decisions, 
and outcomes researchers confronted in a study of one such social movement, the Gezi 
Park protests. In the summer of 2013 and the months that followed, anti-government 
protestors in Turkey were supported by ethnic Turkish minorities living in Europe. These 
protestors took to the streets, created websites and Facebook pages as well as initiated 
offline organizations to express that support. In this study of those European Turks who 
lived in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, we explain how participants were 
recruited and surveyed in this complex and extremely sensitive environment that divided 
the participants from the resistors in the Gezi movement.  The analysis also illustrates 
how the lessons learned from this study can be applied to other social movement research, 
and to other survey research on sensitive issues and with a targeted population.  
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 Most experienced survey researchers are aware of the pitfalls in their work.   
Problems related to sampling, recruitment, response rate, and phrasing of questions are 
the most common.  More recently, issues related to internet-based questionnaires and 
over-researching of populations have been added to the list.   
 What has been less addressed in the problems that confront researchers who 
choose a survey methodology, are the special issues surrounding social movements, and 
particularly within such movements where polarization of positions is the norm.  Social 
movements have become a major focus of scholarship around the world.  The recent 
publication of a three-volume encyclopedia on the topic is an indicator of that focus.  As 
editors David A. Snow et al. point out:  
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It is arguable that social movements, as one of the principle forms through which 
collectivities give voice to their shared grievances and claims by engaging in 
various kinds of collective action or behavior, such as protesting in the streets, 
have escalated with the spread of democracy and the corresponding growth of 
civil society (2013, p. xlii).  
 
The editors also argue that such movements “tend to cluster across time in ‘waves’ or 
‘cycles’, and that events like the Arab Spring or the Occupy protests may indicate the 
presence of such a cycle” (2013, p. xlii). Despite the repression by governments in most 
of the democracy movements, and the gains of many of these movements being reversed, 
such as those in Egypt, Libya and Syria, “nevertheless they have left their trace in the 
sands of popular consciousness and given participants and supporters a sense of shared 
collective efficacy” (Burawoy 2015, p. 15). 
Our study was of the European-based part of a social movement that began in 
Istanbul, Turkey in late May 2013 (referred to as Gezi Park), a movement that developed 
in a similar spirit to the Occupy protests.  The demonstrations began in a small park in 
central Istanbul, one of the few remaining green spaces in the city of 14 million where the 
government had made plans to construct a new shopping center.  The police were ordered 
to attack the protestors encamped in the park at dawn on May 30 using tear gas canisters 
and water canons.  The attack marked the beginning of widespread demonstrations across 
the major cities in the country.  The list of grievances with the authoritarian policies of 
then Prime Minister Erdoğan’s government grew along with the size and scope of the 
demonstrations. A group of about 800 Turkish and Kurdishi minorities in Amsterdam 
alongside many similar gatherings in Frankfurt, Berlin, Brussels, etc., held 
demonstrations in solidarity with their compatriots in Turkey.    
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Our study focused on the minority population in the diaspora living in Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Germany who supported or opposed the acts of civil disobedience in 
Turkey.  Offline and online questionnaires addressing Turkish attitudes and behaviors 
related to Gezi were collected from November 2013 through May 2014.   
We encountered a variety of problems related to the participation of respondents 
in sufficient numbers.  What we learned from this experience should be useful to others 
whose study involves ethnic minorities engaged in activities related to a social movement 
or who are opposed to such engagement. More generally, it may also apply to surveys of 
any targeted population about sensitive issues. This article also describes the collection of 
data in online and offline forms of the same survey and the specific difficulties that 
entailed.  
Contributions to the Literature on Survey Methods used in Protests 
 Traditional survey research of individuals participating in protests has created a 
set of unusual methodological questions. Protests are often short term, requiring a cross-
sectional approach (one that collects data at a single point in time).  Although cross-
sectional data collection is criticized on several counts, Barrington (2012) found that such 
data may be useful.  In comparing survey data from before and after the Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine and before and after the Rose Revolution in Georgia, he learned 
that the “underlying relationships among variables measured by survey data can remain 
quite stable” (p. 312).    
 A bigger challenge for gathering data is the chaotic nature of a demonstration 
with its ever-moving crowds and the difficulty of separating bystanders from actual 
participants. Van Laer (2010) describes in detail the sampling plan for recruiting 
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participants in several demonstrations conducted in Belgium, with some interviewers 
placed in the front and others in the back of the crowd.  
 Other researchers have surveyed activists following the actual protests, selecting 
different formats for data collection.  Some have compared paper and pencil (offline) 
questionnaires to computer-based formats (Booth-Kewley, Larson & Miyoshi 2007).  
These authors found no difference in the disclosure of information concerning 
“impression management”  (or the deliberate attempt to answer in socially desirable 
ways) between the two formats, but respondents who completed the survey on the 
computer provided more answers that indicated the use of  “self-deceptive enhancement” 
(or making more “honestly believed but positive” statements about their behavior). 
Higher levels of disclosure of risky behavior occurred in the answers to questions in the 
computer-based format.   
The questions in surveys of protesters usually require that respondents reveal 
sensitive or personal information that could lead to various kinds of difficulties for them, 
particularly with law enforcement.  Based on other studies that found that individuals are 
more likely to disclose socially undesirable behaviors when using automated methods for 
self-administration of a questionnaire, Lind and her colleagues investigated the reasons 
for this behavior. They found that greater disclosure occurred when the computer-assisted 
self-interviewing was used than when human interviewers asked the questions. They 
concluded that making contact with people’s real or even virtual (computer generated) 
faces resulted in reluctance to provide sensitive information (Lind et al. 2013).  
Questions addressing political or religious issues in surveys like ours frequently 
go unanswered. Kays, Gathercoal and Buhrow (2012) found that “topic sensitivity has a 
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large effect on missing data, and survey format has a moderate effect” (p. 251) in such 
circumstances.  Although a higher percentage of college-age males did not complete the 
sensitive questions, their completion percentage was somewhat higher in the online 
format.   
Frequently the reluctance to disclose information in online surveys is based on the 
concern that anonymity will not be protected. According to Sue and Ritter (2012), 
respondents may be concerned about identity protection because it is easy for researchers 
to attach identifiers to questionnaires or to link the surveys to their personal information. 
Despite measures to protect privacy, the difficulty in delivering on the promises has 
increased over time.  In 2002 Walther critiqued the U.S. Code of Regulations Policies for 
the Protection of Human Subjects regarding these policies, questioning whether such high 
levels of restrictions were really necessary.  
Surveys of participants in social movements may be requesting cooperation from 
those who have more heightened concerns about what may be done with the information 
they disclose.  Also, Walther’s arguments were published nearly 15 years ago when 
methods for accessing information illegally were less sophisticated and when online 
surveys were not in such common use.   
Another problem that arises is the differential focus of protest-based research 
according to discipline of the researcher. Walgrave and Verhulst (2007) point out that 
political science and sociology approach the study of protests differently (political 
science focusing on the individuals in the protests or the micro level, and sociology 
focusing on the social movement organizations or the meso-level as well as the macro 
level where these organizations operate) (p. 1).  The differential focus results in political 
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scientists using surveys that are mostly analyzed quantitatively and sociologists using 
event analysis, content analysis and in-depth interviews that are frequently qualitative in 
nature (p. 1). To address the gap between micro and macro-level research in the same 
study, Walgrave and Verhulst (2007) proposed to survey protestors while they were 
demonstrating and have them mail-in questionnaires distributed at the event.  Next they 
called for conducting such surveys at a number of protests (p. 4).  Van Aelst and 
Walgrave (2001) began this research using a population survey, protest-event analysis 
and interviews with protestors at the actual demonstrations. In order to conduct such 
comprehensive research, scholars must plan their study in advance of the actual 
demonstrations, which is not always possible.  
  No matter where the survey is conducted, protest-based respondents may be 
reluctant to complete a questionnaire given the risks involved. Those risks could include 
being identified by authorities or employers who may not be sympathetic to the protest 
perspective. Rüdig (2010) focused on the problem of non-response bias resulting from 
distributing mail-back surveys distributed during a demonstration. Comparing data from 
a face-to-face survey of demonstrators with a mail survey returned by other 
demonstrators at the same anti-Iraq war protest, he found that women and those who had 
“born a high ‘cost’ of traveling to the event were more likely to return the questionnaires, 
while those who had been frequent attendees at such demonstrations were less likely to 
respond.”  
 The examination of these studies (See Table 1 for summary of literature findings) 
as a whole leads us to conclude that, although several researchers have grappled with 
thorny methodological issues, none of the choices they have made in terms of respondent 
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selection and response rate have been systematically studied over time.  Nor have any of 
the researchers been able to achieve high percentages of responses given the sensitivity of 
the subject matter related to protest activity and the ephemeral nature of any given protest. 
Our Social Movement Study 
 
Our research was initially focused on the use of social media by the Turkish diaspora for 
building social capital.  Two major hypotheses in our survey were related to the building 
of social capital in the diaspora during the Gezi protests in Europe—e.g. that less 
bridging to the majority population in Europe and more bonding to other members of the 
Turkish/Kurdish diaspora would take place during Gezi. In other words, we assumed that 
the Gezi protests would create opportunities for fostering links between like-minded 
people in the diaspora rather than the building of connections between heterogeneous 
groups. 
Currently in most Western European countries, many members of the second and 
third generation of minorities, whose grandparents migrated from Turkey in the 1960s 
and the years following for political or economic reasons, have reached adulthood.  
Given the years they have spent in Europe (in our study an average of 18-24 years), these 
minorities might be expected to be more oriented to the countries where they live than 
those from which their parents or grandparents came.  However, despite having grown up 
in Europe where they have been educated and socialized, many retain the strong ties of 
their families through life lived in Turkish neighborhoods in those European countries 
and the use of Turkish media received by satellites in their homes (d’Haenens & Ogan 
2013; Peeters & d’Haenens 2005). 
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Given this close connection to Turkey, it was not surprising that when the large 
protests broke out in Istanbul and spread around the country in the summer of 2013, 
demonstrations supporting the goals of the protestors in Turkey were held in many 
European cities.  We became interested in the nature of these sympathy protests and the 
possible influence they had on the social capital built by the diaspora participants and 
opponents to the movement. The first generation had many difficulties bridging social 
capital in learning the language, locating employment, and making social contact with 
members of the dominant culture. Their children had fewer problems because they 
attended local schools, learned the country’s language from childhood, and made a range 
of contacts in their home countries.  Many of the respondents to our survey were 
members of the second and third generation. 
The survey findings were mixed in terms of feelings of connectedness to Europe 
and Turkey.  For two of our measures of bridging social capital, more of the people in the 
anti-Gezi group (i.e. Erdoğan/Turkish government supporters) said they felt they 
belonged in the country where they lived and that they had an average of more than 15 
friends who were from the majority population in that country. Those connections were 
unaffected by the events surrounding Gezi.  However, those in the pro-Gezi group had 
stronger feelings of attachment to Turkey and greater interest in life and politics in 
Turkey once the Gezi protests began in Turkey. As a first step in this research we 
conducted a survey of Turkish minorities’ attitudes and behaviors regarding the Gezi 
protests. One of our goals was to study the Turkish minorities’ uses of social media to 
make connections with one another as well as to those staging protests back in Turkey.   
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We selected survey as our methodology for several reasons. First, when we began 
our study, the demonstrations had come to an end in Turkey, and even in the European 
cities there were fewer public protests, thus making interviewing or observing people in 
the streets infeasible.  Second, we wished to determine the range and nature of support 
for the movement across the European countries, and surveying a large segment of the 
population was necessary to do that. Finally, we sought to follow the survey with a social 
network analysis and needed access and permission to follow respondents on their 
Twitter accounts.  
Conducting a survey had several problems. Although some of the issues we 
confronted have been addressed in the literature, to our knowledge no one has written an 
overview of the process by which the issues were managed—successfully or 
unsuccessfully.  Here we will try to provide the rationale for the methodological choices 
we made when faced with a less-than-ideal research environment with the hope that 
others can build on our experiences and apply them when adopting survey methodology 
in social movement studies.   
Recruitment of Respondents 
We wished to reach all Turkish and Kurdish ethnic minorities in the three countries who 
participated in, opposed, or were apathetic toward the protests in Turkey. The ideal 
sample for our study would have been a randomly selected group from both naturalized 
citizens and permanent residents then residing in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany.  
We consider this the ideal for several reasons. Those who chose to complete our 
survey were either enthusiastic supporters of Gezi or equally enthusiastic supporters of 
the Turkish government and the majority party that opposed Gezi. Those more neutral or 
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apathetic towards the social movement were difficult to contact.  If those who 
demonstrated in European streets were simply a strong and vocal fringe group unlike the 
majority of the Turkish diaspora, the conclusions of our study have much less 
significance.  Polarization of the population in Turkey has been on the rise in the years 
since governing party took powerii so securing a random sample would also indicate 
whether similar polarization was taking place in the diaspora.   
Selecting a representative sample to measure political participation from our focus 
population would have been prohibitively expensive. In Germany there are nearly three 
million people of Turkish descent (making up 3.6% of the population, half of them 
belonging to the first generation) (Wolf 2014). In the Netherlands there are about 400,000 
Turkish minorities as of the beginning of 2014, or 2.5% of the population (Centraal 
Bureau voor de Statistiek May 2014). And in Belgium, of the total population of about 11 
million only 218,832 ethnic Turks (or about 2%) reside (Beste wensen 2012). Even these 
figures are estimates, however. There are no population lists for researchers to access, 
and although residents are required to register their addresses with municipal authorities, 
that information is not made available to academic researchers.   
Therefore, we needed to devise more innovative ways of locating these minorities, 
then gain their attention and interest, and finally convince them that completing this 
survey would somehow be important to their lives as well as to the advancement of our 
research goals.   
In such situations, workarounds often need to be created to recruit respondents. 
Facebook and Twitter advertising and posting of calls for participation are increasingly 
used as methods for attracting narrow populations, such as those within a specific age 
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group, or with particular health problems or who engage in certain behaviors like 
smoking or alcohol use (Rife et al. 2016; Rait, Prochaska, & Rubinstein 2015; Valdez et 
al. 2014).  However, the respondents yielded by such methods may not be representative 
of the populations they are drawn from. Bhutta (2012) surveyed thousands of Catholics 
through Facebook recruiting, but found the sample to be “disproportionately female, 
young, educated and religiously active” compared to the overall population (p. 57). In 
another study using Facebook advertising to recruit young people for a health study, the 
sample population tended to be somewhat older and more educated than the target 
population, but the geographic distribution and socioeconomic profile were statistically 
similar (Fenner et al. 2012).  
Researchers have tested the cost and success rate of Facebook recruitment 
compared with other methods. When Rait, Prochaska and Rubinstein (2015) recruited 13-
17- year-olds through traditional methods such as talks in schools, advertising on buses, 
fliers and referrals, they had less success than when they recruited adolescents via 
Facebook.  However, the Facebook ads also yielded a higher rate of ineligibles, while 
referrals were both the most successful and cost effective. Gilligan, Kypri and Bourke 
(2014) also recruited from traditional and social network sources for a study of parents of 
adolescents regarding alcohol use in Australia.  They found that paid Facebook 
advertising was an effective and low-cost method for locating and recruiting a sufficient 
number of the hard-to-reach population for their study.  The literature addressing social 
media use in recruitment mostly pertains to research of health-related topics.  
(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
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Our study relied on a multi-method approach for recruiting respondents that included 
face-to-face, email, social media, and contacts made with small businesses and 
organizations serving the ethnic communities. We began by trying to assemble a list of 
organizations in the several countries that target Turkish minorities for their membership.  
These organizations form for various purposes; some religious, others political or 
economic, and many only for social purposes. Some of these organizations have enjoyed 
financial support from governments in the three countries, but recent austerity measures 
have caused this support to dwindle or disappear, leading to the dissolution of a number 
of them.  So lists that we had secured that included contact information were often invalid.  
 A second strategy was to locate businesses or community groups in 
neighborhoods where minorities are known to reside.  Once there, we blanketed small 
ethnic businesses with flyers containing information about the online survey urging them 
to complete the questionnaire. We also targeted events scheduled by these groups and 
tried to engage potential respondents following the events, offering either online or 
offline options for survey completion.  
 Thirdly, we contacted market research companies and government organizations 
that serve minority groups to ask whether they would share lists of minorities created in 
their work.  This proved to be an unsuccessful strategy given the unwillingness of the 
companies to deliver their contact lists at an affordable price. If conditions changed, and 
if the cost for obtaining an identifiable sample were reasonable, that strategy might be 
used in the future for similar studies. 
Our fourth strategy entailed the use of key words through which we searched 
social media (primarily Facebook) for Turkish/Kurdish diaspora organizations in the 
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several that created group pages. Then we asked the administrators for permission to join 
online groups in Facebook that organized themselves around Turkish subjects of interests 
in the countries of focus. Once we gained membership to those online groups we posted 
information about the survey. That worked well in many cases as we were able to initially 
join 486 Facebook groups, but some groups rejected our request to join and other groups, 
likely annoyed that we might be exploiting membership in the group, retracted their 
permission once we posted requests for participation in the study several times. Still 
others, upset by the intrusion into what was perceived to be a space reserved only for 
their group issues, threatened (or actually reported us) to Facebook management for 
removal.  Others spammed or deleted our posts.  In all, we received 27 email messages 
explaining why they did not accept recruitment for surveys on their group Facebook 
pages.  
Although the rebuffs were troubling, we have faced rejection and even hostility 
based on a perception of privacy invasion in past research when we sent email invitations 
to potential participants. This is the cost of doing survey research in the digital age.  
Incivility in online spaces has been studied in the past (Rowe 2015; Papacharissi 2004), 
but our experience in seeking participants for this academic study addresses a larger 
problem of studying the attitudes and behaviors of people through online surveys and 
attempts to recruit participants in social media environments.  
 
 
 
 
 14 
The Sample Population 
 Our methods of sampling, largely in the snowball style of selection of potential 
respondents, create contact opportunities, but also raise obvious problems – such as those 
of sample validity and reliability, and some specifically related to studying attitudes and 
opinions regarding a social movement.  Regardless of the topic of such a survey, the 
respondents make up a self-selected group who choose to opt into the study.   
The respondents did not represent the larger Turkish community despite our 
interest in recruiting those with more wide-ranging attitudes toward the protests.  As in 
other studies using Facebook to post recruitment messages, those who actually completed 
the survey—either online or offline—tended to be biased towards those who supported 
the demonstrations (68.4% vs. 31.6% who opposed Gezi)iii, those who were younger and 
perhaps more trusting (60% were 30 or younger; 39% were 25 or younger), and those 
who were more educated (73.9% either held at least an undergraduate degree or were 
studying to complete one).  These demographics, especially as they relate to the 
supporters of the Gezi movement, were not so different from those of the protestors in 
Gezi Park in early June, 2013, based on a survey of 4,411 participants in a field survey 
(Konda, 2014, June 5).  In that study 50.8% was female, the mean age was 28, while 
about half (55.7%) of the protestors held one or more university degrees.   
In our survey, characteristics of those who completed the questionnaire offline 
were mixed.  Although somewhat older than the online survey takers, they did not have 
many unique characteristics (See Table 2).  
(TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE) 
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Because the recruitment of respondents lasted over a period of months, members 
of one of the groups of people who were most skeptical of the research motives and 
therefore a group that resisted participation in the study, changed their position and 
decided to complete the survey after all. The reason was likely based on a growing rift 
between two Muslim factions that originally worked together to support the then Turkish 
prime minister’s agenda.  This conflict eventually resulted in the Erdoğan government’s 
decision to target members of the opposition group, the followers of Fethullah Gülen.iv  
Some of the Gülen supporters completed the survey following the events of December 17, 
2013, when tapes were leaked on YouTube revealing alleged corruption activities of 
members of the prime minister’s political party (AKP/Justice and Development) as well 
as his family (“Erdoğan in alleged,” 2014, February 25).  Members of Gülen’s group 
were blamed for the illegal wire taps. We cannot say that all of the 292 respondents who 
completed the survey following the date of the critical split between the groups were 
loyal to the Gülen group, but several of them told us directly that they were. This 
circumstance was specific to our study of a particular social movement, but it may also be 
applied to shifts in loyalties in other movements occurring over time, and researchers 
need to be sensitive to such changes and their implications for validity.  
We were not so successful with other opponents to Gezi—and even with many 
supporters.  The Turkish government not only responded to the demonstrators with water 
canons and tear gas, but with arrests and beatings.  For a time access to YouTube was 
blocked, and rumors and (actual evidence of) investigations of dissidents through 
monitoring of email and social media accounts were widespread (Scott, 2014, March 28; 
Also, see Freedom House, 2015). Perhaps worried that we had ties to Turkish authorities, 
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potential respondents had little reason to trust us—researchers who spoke Turkish but 
were not Turks and as such, outsiders. In Table 3 we present the profiles of those 
respondents who either supported or resisted the Gezi movement.  
(TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE) 
Had we been able to create a probability sample from all of the Turkish ethnic 
minorities in the three countries, we might still have had a high refusal rate, given the 
polarity of positions on the nature of the protests.  Turkey itself is polarized along the 
same lines, and some claim the division has been instigated by those in power (Özkırımlı, 
2014, March 19; Akyol, 2015, April 17).  About equal numbers support or oppose the 
president, while 44% is satisfied with the direction of the government and 51% is 
dissatisfied (Pew Research Center, July 30, 2014).  As researchers we were often 
confronted in anger over the protests themselves, the nature of the questionnaire, and our 
motives for conducting such research.  In those circumstances there would have been no 
way to convince any opponent of the movement who happened to be included in a 
statistically drawn sample to complete our questionnaire. 
Therefore the sample, however imperfect, represents more of those people who 
were participants in or supporters of the Gezi protests and fewer of those who were 
opposed to the protests because they supported the prime minister’s position and/or were 
loyal members of his party.  We tried every plan we could think of to let people know 
about our survey and to convince them of the importance of their participation.  As only 
the three of us were recruiting participants in three countries—both online and in person, 
the job was difficult.   
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Questionnaire Construction 
 The questionnaire consisted of 65 questions, including 6 open-ended questions 
that were content analyzed. The survey instrument was created in English and translated 
into Turkish, Dutch and German for maximum respondent ease for completion.  Native 
speakers of the several languages who were members of the research team served as 
translators, including the authors.  For maximum accuracy, back translations were also 
conducted.  Qualtrics was used for the online version of the survey. Questions covered 
demographics; social and traditional media use (from European and Turkish sources); 
information about their type (on and offline) and degree of participation in the Gezi 
movement; sources of information about Gezi; nature of their pre-Gezi activism, and 
interest and participation in Turkish politics; reasons for participating in the movement; 
as well as sets of attitudinal questions related to belonging to one country or another and 
belonging to a group that shared their feelings about Turkey.  Wherever possible, 5-point 
Likert scales were used as measures.  
 Demographic questions were placed about the middle of the survey, so that if 
respondents dropped out before the end, we could capture at least half of their answers.  
 Other researchers have found that the longer the expected length of a 
questionnaire administered online, the less likely that respondents are to start and/or 
complete a questionnaire and the higher the non-response rates of questions appearing 
near the end (Galesic & Bosnjak 2009). We had similar experiences.  
Offline and Online Data Collection 
 To maximize the number of responses data collected offline and in person 
alongside online surveys were used in our research. Older respondents, those who were 
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non-Internet users, or those that believed their privacy would not be protected preferred 
to complete the questionnaire offline. Each format raised separate issues.  In the offline 
collection, sometimes we sat with respondents—both individually and in groups—while 
they completed the questionnaire.  When this occurred in the group environment, 
respondents sometimes complained about the questionnaire being overly long or that 
more questions were based on protest participation than on resistance to the movement.  
Though a pretest of the questionnaire indicated that respondents could complete it in 
about a half hour, the inclusion of open-ended questions and multi-part questions led to 
actual completion times of much longer times. Social movement research is particularly 
sensitive to biases of the respondents as well as those of the questionnaire. We were 
trying to balance the questionnaire such that a range of attitudes and behaviors related to 
support or opposition to Gezi were included.  To our knowledge, very few events that 
opposed the Gezi protests (i.e. that support Erdoğan) were scheduled in European cities.  
Therefore, the questionnaire was somewhat biased in favor of questions addressing the 
activities of those supporting the movement.  Potential respondents were quite vocal 
about this imbalance in comments made to us personally or within the open-ended 
questions.   
Overall, 2,200 individuals attempted the online version of the questionnaire, but 
only 1583 proceeded far enough to have answered any questions. Out of this number, we 
were only able to include 976 of those questionnaires; the remainder of the questionnaires 
had incomplete or missing demographic information, despite the movement of these 
questions to the middle of the instrument.  
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Some respondents took the questionnaires home and returned them to a central 
location.  This procedure led to a lower response rate among potential respondents in the 
given group, but other options were not available to us when a group gathered for a 
meeting and could not allot sufficient time to complete the survey at the meeting.  
Returned questionnaires through this procedure were more often fully completed than 
through other means, however.  Of those respondents who submitted the survey offline, 
all 107 respondents completed the questionnaire, while only 80% of the online 
submissions (688 out of 860) did so.  
When the online format was used, respondents who quit in the middle would 
sometimes return to the survey and begin again.  We could identify multiple responses 
through a unique identification number assigned to each respondent based on the IP 
numbers from the computers used to complete the survey. However, the software used to 
do that was not entirely reliable given the possibility that the respondent may have used 
different computers connected to different Internet service providers for duplicate surveys.   
Any online survey contains an inherent bias toward those who are younger, more 
affluent and more educated—particularly in a population whose income and educational 
levels tend to be lower than the general population.  Our survey was no exception.  Of the 
967 respondents included in the final analysis, 59.9% were age 30 or younger, and 38.6% 
were age 25 or younger. The Turkish diaspora living in Europe is documented as having 
a relatively low level of educational attainment when compared to the majority 
population.  However, our survey respondents were highly educated with 20.4% 
reporting that they were undergraduate students and an additional 53.5% having 
completed an undergraduate or post-graduate degree.   
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And there are other problems related to validity of such surveys that have been 
documented by scholars (see Wiersma, 2013).  This social movement did include people 
who were older, less educated and less affluent, but younger people were certainly more 
visible in the street protests and in related activities (Polat, Bakiroğlu & Sahin 2013; 
Varnali & Gorgulu 2014). 
Privacy and its Influence on Methodology 
The political situation in Turkey leading up to and during the Gezi protests was such that 
many people were afraid that the government was monitoring personal email, mobile 
phones, and social media accounts.  Evidence that this was occurring was found in news 
stories (See Daloğlu 2013; Freedom House 2013). Many of the respondents in our survey 
hold dual citizenship (42 per cent of respondents in Belgium, 36 per cent of those in the 
Netherlands, and 22 per cent of those in Germany) while others have not yet acquired 
European citizenship (a total of 82.3 per cent are citizens of Turkey—including those 
with dual citizenship), so reprisals for expressing criticism of the government through 
Gezi participation were entirely possible.  More than 95 per cent of the respondents also 
return to Turkey frequently to vacation or visit family. We asked questions about the 
level of support and feeling of risk due to Gezi park protests in the survey.  Out of the 
total sample, 41.6 per cent agreed with the statement that they felt at risk. Some 
respondents mentioned this fear in open-ended questions. When asked how much time 
they had spent in Turkey in the last five years, only 1.3 per cent said they had not been in 
Turkey, while 46.1 per cent had spent more than 6 months in Turkey during that period.  
In the year following Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s election to the presidency, at least 
700 people, and possibly as many as 1,000, were prosecuted for insulting him (including 
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at least one teenager) (Alan & Keskin 2015). So it is not hard to understand that Turkish 
minorities, even those living far from Turkey, were concerned that information we were 
gathering might be used against them in some way or that they might be personally 
identified through the survey instrument despite reassurances to the contrary.  These 
concerns led to refusals in some instances and required extensive convincing in others.  
As authors, we also had concerns about repercussions, because representatives of the 
Turkish government approached us via email about the purpose in conducting the study.  
Fears of reprisals could occur across a range of social movements, so it is particularly 
important to address the issues of privacy and anonymity.  
 At the end of the survey we asked respondents to provide their Twitter user names 
so we could follow their activity related to Gezi in the social medium. Although we 
disclosed our purpose, this request aroused additional concern over invasion of privacy 
despite the many users who willingly listed their account information. Part of our larger 
study was to analyze tweets related to Gezi from Turks in the diaspora living in the three 
countries of our study.  To do that we needed to identify which tweets were being posted 
from those countries, as geolocating methods are not entirely reliable, and the European-
based tweets were mixed with other tweets using the same hashtags. About half the 
respondents reported having a Twitter account. This percentage is higher than the 
penetration rate for the population in the several countries of our study, but our 
respondents are younger than the general population, and Twitter is a very popular social 
medium among Turks, especially since the start of the Gezi movement.  According to 
Linkedin SlideShare, in July 2014, 72% of Internet users in Turkey had a Twitter account.  
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Given the low levels of trust in completing this study, we were pleased that 16% of the 
respondents supplied their Twitter account user names.  
 Another method we used to recruit respondents and identify individuals to follow 
on Twitter was to join Facebook pages created by members of the Turkish diaspora. 
When these pages allowed open registration, we could simply add our own names as 
members.  However, many pages required administrator approval.  It is likely that 
because we do not all have Turkish names we were denied access to some of these pages. 
Some potential respondents asked us why as non-Turks we were doing this research. 
Others wrote notes—some polite and others filled with rude comments about Gezi 
protestors being “retarded” or making personal attacks on us based on the fact that two of 
us are not European or about our posting inappropriate content to those web pages.   In 
some cases, the survey was deemed to be political, and therefore in violation of the rules 
of the group.  In other cases, the notes commented on the perceived pro-Gezi tone to the 
questionnaire, and in a few extreme cases referring to it as a “terrorist activity.”  As a 
result we were obliged to either leave those groups, or the administrator removed the post 
that contained our survey link. We protected the privacy of the participants in the study. 
Anonymity was also assured through the collection methods used by Qualtrics, a 
company that has certified its adherence to Safe Harbor principles (‘Privacy Statement,’ 
n.d.). 
Trust 
 The World Values Survey, which has been measuring global values and their 
impact on social and political life since 1981 through periodic international surveys has 
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consistently found that Turks rank among the lowest in the world in their feeling that 
“most people can be trusted” (see Diez Madrano and World Values Survey, n.d.).  
 As members of an out-group, we experienced the same lack of trust from potential 
respondents and believe that mistrust led to lower participation levels in the survey itself.  
Of course other reasons also contributed to the refusals, but the cultural predisposition to 
find out-group members untrustworthy was a factor.  Because the building of trust is 
particularly important in social movements (Nip 2004), it is at least as important that 
researchers of those social movements be trusted by the community members. 
Dineson (2013) studied levels of trust in European immigrants.  If culture of the 
country of origin of the immigrants determined their levels of interpersonal trust, the 
researcher believed the immigrants to Western Europe would continue to trust at similar 
levels.  But if trust varied by the institutional quality of the countries where they currently 
lived (e.g., there was little corruption in their new home countries), they believed 
immigrants would tend to trust others at higher levels.  Testing his hypotheses on 
immigrants from 90 countries of origin who currently made their home in 18 Western 
European countries, Dineson (2013) found evidence that both cultural heritage and 
institutional context were significant factors in their levels of interpersonal trust. Possibly 
the low levels of trust of the Turkish ethnic minorities in completing a survey about their 
activism regarding political events might be explained by their cultural tendency to 
distrust out-group members regardless of the institutional quality in Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Germany compared to that of Turkey.  
Lack of trust for the Turkish minorities in Europe was also based on the divisive 
political culture in Turkey, particularly critical to the Gezi movement. Even before the 
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Gezi protests broke out in 2013, hostility toward Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan was on 
the rise among secular Turks, who perceived him as intruding into their personal lives 
and denigrating the contributions of Ataturk to the country’s very existence (Arango 
2012). This caused potential participants to view us with suspicion, especially if they 
were supporters of the prime minister.  We were identified as foreign because of our 
physical appearance, our names, and  information easily available about us online.  The 
“foreigner” problem prevented us from getting information from government-based 
organizations such as the Diyanet (official religious arm of the Turkish government with 
a presence in several European countries). Although many scholars who conduct research 
on any topic may be considered outsiders, this issue is particularly acute in a politically 
charged environment. We made every attempt to present ourselves as impartial and 
refused to share personal information that might affect potential respondents’ trust in us 
or our work.   
There is also reason to believe that the lack of trust is not specific to the Turkish 
diaspora.  In a study of 50,000 Italians, Sabatini and Sarracino (2014) found that people 
who use online social networks (i.e. Facebook and Twitter), have lower levels of trust 
overall.  
Terminology Issues and Feedback 
 One of the advantages of using social media to post links to surveys is the 
potential for unsolicited responses from anyone who encounters the post.  These can be 
useful for making adjustments in the study.  Sometimes people responded in anger, even 
cursing us, for daring to ask questions about Gezi while others offered useful suggestions 
regarding terminology or question phrasing. 
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When designing the questionnaire, we were aware of the diversity in the Turkish 
diaspora.  Although the majority of the first migrants had come to Europe as 
guestworkers who were  later joined by their families as far back as the 1960s, there were 
also political refugees (often Kurdish) and those who came for educational advancement 
in the group.  Some of the respondents had only recently arrived and were born and 
raised in Turkey, while others were European-born from the second or third generation of 
arrivals. Most were Sunni Muslim, but many were Aleviv or declared no religion. 
Although the majority of this diaspora were ethnic Turks, Kurds represented a significant 
percentage.  To describe this group with one word, ‘Turkish,’ did not necessarily cover 
the diverse backgrouds of our respondents. A debate over whether the term ‘Turkish’ 
should be used to describe the people who live in the nation of Turkey has gone on for a 
number of years (See Baskin 2011, and Grigoriadis 2007).  Kurds object to the term as 
they are not ethnic Turks and see the term Turkish as deliniating ethnicity, not nationality.  
It has been suggested that the term ‘Türkiyeli’ be used to describe those who are from the 
country, i.e. citizens, but not necessarily of Turkish ethnicity and also for those who are 
of Turkish ethnicity but have never lived in Turkey.  We first chose to use the phrase ‘of 
Turkish origin’ to include all groups in our study.  Two respondents who commented on 
the use of that phrase insisted that most people living in Europe want to distinguish 
themselves from those living in Turkey by the use of Türkiyeli to describe their 
relationship to the country. It would also be a more inclusive term with relation to the 
potential Kurdish respondents.   Following a change in the reference to identity, we 
received several comments referring to difficulty with the term. “First off, those of us 
who live outside Turkey are not Türkiyeli.  There were Turks before the borders of 
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Turkey had even been drawn on the maps,” wrote one respondent.  Another respondent 
commented that ‘there are no Türkiyeli here, only Kurdistanli (meaning Kurds who wish 
to establish their own country within Turkish borders).’  Rather than change the term 
back to “people of Turkish origin,”  we politely explained our reasoning to those who 
sent us critical messages. Linguistic equivalance for whatever term chosen in English, 
Dutch and German further complicated the choice.  
We believe that the negative reactions came from ethnic Turks who were 
somehow offended by the inclusive term and did not want to be lumped in with those of 
other ethnicities or believed that the term Turkish meant anyone who came from Turkey 
and there was no need for a new term to describe them.  We note, however, that we refer 
to our respondents as Turkish ethnic minorities here to simplify the reference.  We do not 
mean to imply that those of Kurdish origin (who may have been born in Turkey or to 
Kurdish parents in Europe) are ethnically Turkish. Though this problem was specific to 
our research, it represents the importance of anticiptating the ways in which terminology 
is determined for use in any survey where respondent identity may affect the outcome. 
When multiple languages are used in the survey instrument, the issue becomes 
increasingly complicated.  
Methodological Lessons for Future Research 
 At first glance, many of the issues raised above might be thought to evolve from 
the emic/etic controversy over who should be conducting the research.  None of us are 
insiders; we were not born in Turkey nor raised in an ethnically Turkish or Kurdish 
family in a European country.  That might limit our complete understanding of the 
culturally based points we have raised. This is a problem for many researchers working 
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across cultures.  Researching social movements adds to that problem, however.  Social 
movements are goal-oriented and participants often wish to associate with only those who 
share their point of view; and that problem may be exacerbated in an environment where 
social network use predominates.  A researcher may encounter hostility when raising the 
opposition’s point of view for consideration.  Since our research was focused on the 
protests and the degree and nature of the participation, those who chose not to participate 
or were opposed to the demonstrations were less willing to answer questions in a survey 
with such a focus (see Table 2 for the profiles of both pro-Gezi and anti-Gezi 
respondents).  
 Thinking over the objections people made to the imbalance in the questionnaire,  
we might have created more questions related to the reasons for non-participants to 
oppose the demonstrations—or even a separate equivalent questionnaire that could be 
selected by the respondent. That would have provided a more complete picture of the 
several sides taken by members of the diaspora.  For us, the focus was on the Gezi 
protests, and our major goal was to capture the attitudes of those involved in the 
demonstrations and the impact of their activities on their lives spent in European 
countries.  
 One particularly useful strategy for increasing participation in the study was 
found in the use of informants.  These people made contact with us first through email or 
social media.  Sometimes they were known through contact one of us had made in 
previous research.  Other times they were just people we encountered at meetings or 
social events. Colleagues or friends located across the region were also helpful. Because 
they were trusted in their communities. If they were activists, they encouraged others in 
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their groups to take the survey.  If they had a wide circle of friends either offline or in 
social media, they reposted our survey or distributed the questionnaire.  The number of 
responses would have remained quite low if we had not made these contacts and built 
additional relationships.  When we began the study, our biggest concern was the level of 
survey completion, but as time went on, more people heard about it and were persuaded 
to complete the study.   
In Table 4 we have laid out the several recommendations we offer for anyone 
conducting similar research.  It is hoped that the  information we have provided here will 
be useful to others who are confronted with decisions related to questionnaire format and 
recruitment of participants in social movements.  
(TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE) 
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Table 1. Survey studies Studying Ethnic Minorities Engaged in a Social Movement 
 
General Social Movement Research 
 
  Focus  Authors/Dates   Major Finding 
 
Social Movements over time Snow et al., 2013  Social movements cluster in  
        waves or cycles 
 
Use of cross-sectional data    Barrington (2012)  Before and after study of  two 
        movements found relationships 
are stable over time.  
 
Surveying Crowd at Demon- Van Laer (2010)   Placing interviewers in front 
stration  and back of crowd reduces 
  response bias. 
 
Format of Questionnaire 
 
Comparison of offline to online    Booth-Kewley, Larson  No differences in use of  
                                                                and Myoshi  (2007)  impression management; higher 
disclosure of risky behavior 
online 
 
Use of automated methods            Lind, Schober, Conrad,   Greater disclosure of socially 
and face-to-face methods               and Richert (2013)  undesireable behavior when 
  no contact with person’s face 
 
Comparison of offline to online    Kays, Gathercoal and   Higher completion rate in online 
                                                                Buhrow (2012)         format 
 
Face-to-face vs. mail survey           Rüdig (2010)  Higher mail return from women 
  And those who had sacrificed to  
  travel to the protest; frequent  
 attenders had lower response 
rate 
 
                                            Recruitment/nature of Respondents 
 
 
Recruiting via Facebook              Rait, Prochaska, Rubinstein Higher success rate on Facebook 
vs. traditional methods                 (2015)    but also higher rate of ineligibles 
 
Facebook advertising               Gilligan, Kypri and Bourke          Facebook advertising was cost- 
                (2014)    Effective and successful 
 
Facebook recruiting              Bhutta (2012)   Very successful, but sample was 
        more female, younger, educated, 
        and religiously active.  
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Table 2. Profile of Online vs. offline  
 
 Online 
 
Offline 
 
Gender   
 Male 52.8% 56.1% 
 Female 47.2% 43.9% 
   
Age  (Mean) 30.4 years 36.3 years 
   
Educational Level University Grad 
+ 
University Grad     
– 
   
Country where they live   
  Belgium 31.6%  56.1% 
  The Netherlands 32.8% 30.8% 
  Germany 35.6% 13.1% 
   
Length of time spent in Europe (mean) 19.6 years 23.6  years 
Born in Turkey 
            Europe 
 
50.7% 
49.3% 
57.7%  
41.3% 
Feel they belong to a faith 63.6% 76.6% 
Completion rate 80.0%  100.0% 
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Table 3. Profile of Pro- and Anti-Gezi Respondents 
 
 Pro-Gezi 
 
Anti-Gezi 
 
Gender   
 Male 51.3% 56.6% 
 Female 48.7% 43.4% 
   
Age  (Mean) 32.6 years 28.2 years 
   
Educational Level University Grad 
+ 
University Grad 
– 
Country where they live   
  Belgium 36.8%  29.2% 
  The Netherlands 27.5 42.0 
  Germany 35.7 28.8 
   
Length of time spent in Europe (mean)       18.2 years       23.5  years 
Born in Turkey 
             Europe 
 
 
37.6% 
62.2% 
70.6%  
37.6% 
Feel they belong to a faith 51.4% 94.5% 
Have a Twitter account 69.9% 30.4% 
 
Disclosure of the Twitter account                                         
 
79.9% 
 
20.1% 
Disclosure of the Email address 
 
Start date before December 17th 
                 after December 17th 
           
 
 72.1% 
 
65.2% 
72.7% 
27.9% 
 
34.8% 
27.3% 
Conservative (strongly agree, agree) 
Religious conservative(strongly agree, agree) 
 
 
9.3% 
9.2% 
 
55.2% 
59.3% 
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Table 4.  
Recommendations for Using Online Surveys in Social Movements Focused on Ethnic 
Minorities 
 
Sampling 
 Include the opposition/the indifferent to survey the spectrum of opinion 
 Random samples may not be possible or even ideal 
 Use multiple strategies to reach a far-flung population 
 
Recruitment 
 Consider using social media and Facebook or other advertising 
 Offline recruitment taps a population you won’t find online 
Remain as neutral as possible in presenting your self and your survey to 
attract a range of respondents 
 
Question Formation/Design 
Work for balance in question phrasing regarding support or opposition of the 
movement   
 Keep questionnaire to a reasonable length; no more than 20 minutes. 
Place demographic questions close to the beginning for those who may not 
complete the survey 
Consider an introduction to the survey that presents the idea that multiple 
viewpoints are desired—not just those in favor of the social movement 
  
Use of Multiple Languages 
 Understand that more than translation is at stake   
Key terms may not carry similar meaning or represent hot button issues in 
different languages 
Use of open-ended questions mean that you will need to translate as well as 
content analyze those answers  
 
Build Trust but be Prepared for Criticism 
Include a researcher/contact person of the same ethnicity as those being 
surveyed 
Reassure respondents that privacy and anonymity is respected.  
Rely on trusted informants from the beginning 
 Provide email contact information; then get ready for emails and respond!  
 Criticisms may lead to changes in the questionnaire—even after a pretest 
 Respond as politely and professionally as possible, even to rude comments 
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i We included the part of the Kurdish diaspora whose roots are in Turkey.  About 
18% of Turkey’s population is made up of Ethnic Kurds (“The time of the Kurds,” 
Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-
africa/time-kurds/p36547?gclid=CI_44uCS_8sCFZeEaQodCEEOsQ#!/?cid=ppc-
Google-grant-kurds_infoguide-072715  Many Kurds have migrated to Europe for 
political reasons.  
ii In the last several years Turkey has been pulled apart by ethnic, religious, and 
political differences that have resulted in tensions and much violence across the 
country.  For more information, see Hintz, L. (2015, October 15). “The heinous  
consequences of Turkey’s polarization.” The Washington Post  
(https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/10/15/the-
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